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Empowering Settlors:  How Proper Language Can Increase  






With hostile trust litigation reaching epidemic proportions, many people within the trust industry 
are interested in identifying new and less expensive ways to resolve trust-related disputes.  
Arbitration is often proposed as a possible alternative, although questions exist about whether 
and to what extent a mandatory arbitration provision found in a trust will be considered 
enforceable by a court. 
 
Up until now, most commentary in this area of law has focused on purely jurisprudential issues, 
with little attention being paid to the practical efforts that settlors can make to increase the 
enforceability of arbitration provisions found in trusts.  This Article takes a slightly different 
approach to the question of trust arbitration in that it analyzes the extent to which a settlor can 
overcome the various legal challenges facing mandatory trust arbitration through appropriate use 
of language in the trust.   
 
In so doing, this Article not only discusses the opinions of both courts and commentators, it also 
analyzes the effectiveness of various model arbitration clauses specially drafted by two of the 
world’s leading arbitral institutions, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), for use in trusts.  Although these provisions have 
been in existence since 2003 and 2008 respectively, no commentator has yet discussed them in 
any depth.  This Article fills that gap, providing settlors and trustees with practical, yet 
theoretically sound, advice on how to draft an enforceable arbitration provision in a trust.  In so 
doing, the Article also introduces a number of relevant judicial opinions that have not yet entered 
the legal literature. 
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Trusts have become an increasingly popular means of structuring wealth in the United States, 
both in the testamentary and commercial contexts.
1
  However, as the use of the trust has grown, 
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1
 See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C. L. REV. __, *22 
(forthcoming 2012); John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:  The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107 
YALE L.J. 165, 177-78 (1997) [hereinafter Langbein, Commercial Trusts]. 
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so, too, has the number of trust-related lawsuits, with some commentators claiming that hostile 
trust litigation has reached “near epidemic” levels.2    
Excessive litigation is problematic in any context, given the time and cost associated with 
defending and pursuing a lawsuit and the attendant disruption in the parties’ lives and businesses.  
However, litigation may be particularly unwelcome in the context of trusts.  Not only do 
attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reduce the amount of money that is available to 
beneficiaries, thus thwarting one of the primary goals of the settlor, but the public airing of trust-




However, litigation is not the only way to resolve legal disputes.  Arbitration has long 
been used in a wide variety of contexts, including consumer, employment, labor, securities, 
antitrust, commercial, maritime and international law,
4
 pursuant to strong state and federal 
policies in favor of alternative means of dispute resolution.
5
  Arbitration has even been used to 
resolve trust-related disputes.
6
   
However, certain distinctions exist among the various types of trust controversies.  For 
example, most contemporary arbitration relating to trusts involves disputes between the trust and 
                                                          
2
 Lawrence Cohen & Marcus Staff, The Arbitration of Trust Disputes, 7 J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 203, 203 
(1999); see also American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC), Arbitration Task Force Report 22 (Sept. 
2006), available at http://www.mnbar.org/sections/probate-
trust/ACTEC%20Arbitration%20Task%20Force%20Report-2006.pdf; Horton, supra note 1, at *3 (suggesting 
“estate plans generate more lawsuits ‘than any other legal instrument’”). 
3
 See Robert Flannigan, Business Applications of the Express Trust, 36 ALBERTA L. REV. 630, 631 (1998); Frances 
S. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 563, 610-11, 615 (2008); Georg von Segesser, Arbitrability in 
Estate and Trust Litigation, in PAPERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF ESTATE AND TRUST LAW – 2000 21, 21 
(Rosalind F. Atherton ed. 2001); Tina Wüstemann, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2007, 33, 33-34, 40 (Christoph Müller ed., 2007). 
4
 See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 839 (2009) [hereinafter BORN, ICA]. 
5
 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1995).  Many trusts reflect an 
international or interstate component that brings them within the ambit of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).  See 9 
U.S.C. §§1-307 (2011); Horton, supra note 1, at *20. 
6
 See ACTEC, supra note 2, at 13; Horton, supra note 1, at *7-10; Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration:  Step-child of Wills 
and Estates, 11 ARB. J. 179 (1956); Blaine Covington Janin, Comment, The Validity of Arbitration Provisions in 
Trust Instruments, 55 CAL. L. REV. 521, 524-28 (1967). 
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external third party agents or advisors.
7
  The relationships and issues considered in these types of 
proceedings strongly resemble standard commercial disputes, making this type of arbitration 
largely unremarkable.  Arbitration of internal trust disputes involving matters relating to the 
inner workings of the trust, on the other hand, is much rarer.  These types of proceedings not 
only raise issues that are not usually seen in other areas of commercial practice, they also address 
conflicts between all or some of the various parties to a trust, including trustees, protectors 
and/or beneficiaries, and thus involve relationships that are somewhat distinct from those seen in 
the standard business context.
8
   
Despite these distinctive characteristics, there is no per se bar to arbitration of internal 
trust disputes.  Indeed, a number of these types of concerns are explicitly described as being 
amenable to arbitration under the Uniform Trust Code (UTC).
9
  Instead, the difference in 
treatment appears to arise as a result of the manner in which each type of arbitration is invoked.  
External trust disputes are generally made subject to arbitration through an arbitration agreement 
contained within a contract that exists apart from the trust itself.
10
  Internal trust disputes, on the 
                                                          
7
 See Laughton v. CGI Tech. & Sol’ns, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 2d 262, 263-64 (D. Mass. 2009); Delaney Elec. Co., Inc. 
v. Schiessle, 601 N.E. 2d 978, 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); United States Trust Co., N.A. v. Cavalieri, No. 
HHDCV070513653S, 2008 WL 1822721, at *1 (Conn. Super. Apr. 1, 2008).  This type of arbitration is often 
promoted through pro-arbitration provisions based on the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), which has been adopted by 
24 U.S. states in whole or in part.  See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), 
Uniform Trust Code §§111, 816(23) (2000), last revised or amended in 2005, available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uta/2005final.htm [hereinafter UTC]; see also NCCUSL, UTC Status, 
available at www.nccusl.org.  Some states have enacted even more favorable provisions regarding the arbitration of 
trust disputes.  See Idaho Code Ann. §§15-8-101, 15-8-103 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code §§11.96A.010, 11.96A.030 
(2012).  Though most of this legislation simply describes which types of matters are amenable to arbitration without 
indicating how such procedures are to arise, two states – Arizona and Florida – have enacted statutes explicitly 
indicating that settlors may require arbitration of future disputes through use of a mandatory arbitration provision in 
a trust.  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-10205 (2011); Fla. St. Ann. §731.401 (2011). 
8
 See Michael Hwang, Arbitration of Trust Disputes, in GUIDE TO THE WORLD’S LEADING EXPERTS IN COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 83, 83 (Legal Media Group ed., 2009).  Different commentators define internal and external trust 
disputes differently.  See Paul Buckle & Carey Olsen, Trust Disputes and ADR, 14 TR. & TRUSTEES 649, 651 
(2008); Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 38. 
9
 See UTC, supra note 7, §§111, 816(23) (2000); Idaho Code Ann. §§15-8-101, 15-8-103 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code 
§§11.96A.010, 11.96A.030 (2012).   
10
 See S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes:  Two Bodies of Law Collide (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter 
Strong, Two Bodies Collide].   
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other hand, predominantly arise as a result of a mandatory arbitration provision located in the 
trust itself.
11
   
This is a somewhat problematic state of affairs, since external disputes with third party 
agents or advisors are not the most common type of controversy to arise in this area of law.
12
  
Instead, “[m]ost trust disputes are internal disputes.”13  Furthermore, settlors and trustees have 
expressed a significant and increasing amount of interest in this latter type of arbitration, even 
though the procedure is somewhat controversial.
14
   
As interesting as questions about the jurisprudential propriety of mandatory arbitration of 
internal trust disputes may be, this Article does not propose to address such matters, since that 
topic is discussed in detail elsewhere.  Indeed, most commentators
15
 and a growing number of 
                                                          
11
 See Horton, supra note 1, at *3-4.  Internal trust disputes could be made subject to post-dispute arbitration 
agreements among all the parties, but submission agreements (also known as compromis) are notoriously difficult to 
object due to litigation strategies that arise once a conflict has begun.  See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS:  DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 37 (2010) [hereinafter BORN, 
DRAFTING].  Internal trust disputes are occasionally arbitrated as the result of an arbitration agreement with external 
third party agents, but that happens only rarely.  For example, arbitration of internal trust matters may result in cases 
where (1) a side agreement that includes an arbitration provision has been explicitly incorporated by reference into a 
trust or (2) a side agreement that includes an arbitration provision explicitly refers to disputes arising out of an 
associated trust.  See Decker v. Bookstaver, No. 4:09-CV-1361, 2010 WL 2132284, at *1-2 (E.D. Mo. May 26, 
2010); New South Federal Savings Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 639 (S.D. Miss. 2005).   
12




 See Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions:  A Powerful Tool to Prevent 
Contentious and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable? 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 351, 352-53 
(2007); Horton, supra note 1, at *3; Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts:  Defining the Parameters 
for Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 118, 118-19 (2011); Wüstemann, supra 
note 3, at 41.  Some of the objections are based on a misunderstanding of the nature of arbitration, see Bridget A. 
Logstrom, Arbitration in Estate and Trust Disputes:  Friend or Foe? 30 AM. COLL. TR. & ESTATES COUNS. J. 266, 
266 (2005) (claiming arbitrators can ignore legal precedent and decide issues as a matter of equity), while others 
focus more on questions of enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions in trusts, see Horton supra note 1, at 
*4-5. 
15
 See ACTEC, supra note 2, at 34-42; Buckle & Olsen, supra note 3, at 655; Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 210; 
David Fox, Non-excludable Trustee Duties, 17 TR. & TRUSTEES 17, 25 (2011); Horton, supra note 1, at *54; Charles 
Lloyd & Jonathan Pratt, Trust in Arbitration, 12 TR. & TRUSTEES 18, 18 (2006); Logstrom, supra note 14, at 266-
68; Gail E. Mautner & Heidi L.G. Orr, A Brave New World:  Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Procedures Under the 
Uniform Trust Code and Washington’s and Idaho’s Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Acts, 35 AM. C. TR. & EST. 
COUNS. J. 159, 181 (2009); Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts:  A 
Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RES. 627, 630 (2011); E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming:  Protecting the 
Abhorrent Testator From Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. 







 appear to adopt the view that mandatory arbitration clauses located in 
trusts are enforceable, despite a few well-publicized judicial decisions to the contrary.
18
  Instead, 
this Article considers the claim made by numerous experts that the enforceability of arbitral 
provisions in trusts can be improved through the use of appropriate language in the clause 
itself.
19
   
This is an intriguing issue.  Although conventional wisdom supports the idea that settlors 
can provide for mandatory trust arbitration by using particular terms and phrases, that advice is 
often presented in a cursory and somewhat conclusory manner.  Indeed, no one has yet 
undertaken a detailed, in-depth analysis of whether and to what extent settlors can avoid or 
mitigate any of the major jurisprudential problems traditionally associated with mandatory trust 
arbitration through proper drafting.
20
  This Article aims to fill that gap by considering the various 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Timothy P. O’Sullivan, Family Harmony:  An All Too Frequent Casualty of the Estate Planning Process, 8 
MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR 253, 315 (2007). 
16
 See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text. 
17
 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-10205 (2011); Fla. St. Ann. §731.401 (2011); see also The Trusts (Guernsey) Law 
2007, §63, available at http://www.guernseylegalresources.gg/ccm/legal-resources/laws/trusts/the-trusts-guernsey-
law-2007.en; Trustee (Amendment) Bill 2011, §18, available at  
http://www.bacobahamas.com/PDF/Trustee%20(Amendment)%20Bill%202011%20-%2015%20April%202011.pdf. 
It is possible that the UTC and similar state statutes could be construed to permit mandatory trust arbitration, 
although the relevant provisions are somewhat ambiguous as to how arbitration may arise.  See UTC, supra note 7, 
§§111, 816(23) (2000); Idaho Code Ann. §§15-8-101, 15-8-103 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code §§11.96A.010, 
11.96A.030 (2012).   
18
 See Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review filed Sept. 8, 2011; Diaz v. 
Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612-13  (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (2011).  
Notably, both these decisions are currently on appeal to higher courts. 
19
 See ACTEC, supra note 2, at 34-42; Gerardo J. Bosques-Hernández, Arbitration Clauses in Trusts:  The U.S. 
Developments and a Comparative Perspective, 3 REVISTA PARA EL ANALISIS DEL DERECHO (INDRET) 1, 12 (2008), 
available at  http://www.indret.com/pdf/559_en.pdf; Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 221-23; David Hayton, Future 
Trends in International Trust Planning, 13 JORDANS J. INT’L TR. & CORP. PLAN. 55, 72 (2006); David Hayton, 
Problems in Attaining Binding Determination of Trust Issues by Alternative Dispute Resolution, in PAPERS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF ESTATE AND TRUST LAW – 2000, supra note 3, at 11, 17; Hwang, supra note 8, at 84; 
John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 662 (1995) [hereinafter 
Langbein, Contractarian]; Bridget A. Logstrom et al., Resolving Disputes With Ease and Grace, 31 AM. COLL. TR. 
& ESTATES COUNS. J. 235, 241-44 (2005); O’Sullivan, supra note 15, at 315-16; Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra 
note 10; Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 45.  
20
 Passing references and offhand suggestions are, however, routinely made on this subject.  See UTC, supra note 7, 
§816(23), cmt.; ACTEC, supra note 2, at 34-42; Jonathan G. Blattmacht, Reducing Estate and Trust Litigation 
Through Disclosure, In Terrorem Clauses, Mediation and Arbitration, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFL. RESOL. 237, 247-48, 
260-61 (2008); Bosques-Hernández, supra note 19, at 7-8, 12; Hayton, supra note 19, at 72; Hayton, supra note 19, 
7 
 
challenges facing mandatory trust arbitration and determining the extent to which each of these 
issues can be positively affected through language used by the settlor in the trust.   
However, this Article also makes a second contribution to the development of this area of 
law.  At this point, most of the analysis concerning mandatory trust arbitration has come from the 
trust law community, with relatively little input from experts in arbitration.
21
  The lack of 
interaction between experts in trust and arbitration law means that a number of important 
developments in arbitration law have been largely overlooked by the trust industry.
22
  The lack of 
integration between trust and arbitration law also means that a number of proposals generated by 
the trust law community with respect to mandatory trust arbitration may meet requirements 
imposed by trust law but fail to comply with “best practices” in arbitration law.23   
One example of the kind of problems that can arise as a result of this sort of analytical 
isolationism involves suggestions that settlors adopt certain language drafted entirely by the 
author of whatever scholarly article is at issue.
24
  While these proposals may address certain 
issues that arise as a matter of trust law and may constitute an important contribution to the 
literature in this area of practice,
25
 they often do not comply with advice by arbitration 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
at 17; Hwang, supra note 8, at 84; Katzen, supra note 14, at 125-27; Logstrom et al., supra note 19, at 241-44; 
O’Sullivan, supra note 15, at 315-16; Spitko, supra note 15, at 297-99; Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 45-47. 
21
 The only nationally or internationally recognized specialist in arbitration law to have written on mandatory trust 
arbitration is Michael Hwang, and his analysis is quite brief.  See Hwang, supra note 8, at 83-84.    
22
 See Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 10; see also infra notes 31-34. This is not to say that the arbitral 
community has been actively excluded from the discussion in any way.  Instead, the problem seems to be that 
arbitration and trust law appear to operate somewhat in isolation from each other.  This separatism is due to some 
extent to the specialized nature of trust law and procedure and the way in which trust matters are often heard in 
special probate divisions or chancery courts.  See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES:  
INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 626 (2010); James W. Martin, Ten Tips for Handling Complex 
Probate, 84 FLA. B.J. 45-52 (Feb. 2010); John T. Rogers, Jr., Avoiding and Managing Litigation (For Planners and 
Fiduciaries), SS043 ALI-ABA 791 (June 12-17, 2011) at III.C.1.   
23
 See infra notes 31-34. 
24
 Some commentators propose entire arbitral clauses while others simply suggest one or two phrases.  See ACTEC, 
supra note 2, at 34-42; Blattmacht, supra note 20, at 247-48, 260-61; Hayton, supra note 19, at 72; Hayton, supra 
note 19, at 17; Logstrom et al., supra note 19, at 241-44.   
25
 Often these articles only address certain narrow concerns rather than considering the entire range of issues facing 
mandatory trust arbitration.  See, e.g., Blattmacht, supra note 20 (only dealing with in terrorem provisions). 
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specialists.  For example, experts in arbitration strongly recommend that parties begin with well-
known, well-tested language before tailoring it to their own particular needs.
26
  The best place 
for a drafting party to begin is with a model clause propounded by a reputable arbitral institution, 
since those clauses tend to provide comprehensive and well-tested language.
27
   
This could appear to create several problems for proponents of mandatory trust 
arbitration.  For example, many of the most successful and popular institutional clauses are 
targeted to controversies in other subject matter areas, such as labor, employment, consumer or 
commercial law.
28
  Furthermore, the unique challenges associated with mandatory trust 
arbitration suggest that a non-specific arbitral clause may not be the most appropriate starting 
point for someone intent on creating an enforceable arbitration provision in a trust, even though 
standard commercial clauses have been successfully used in trust arbitrations in the past.
29
  
                                                          
26
 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 11, at 37.  By avoiding non-standard terms and phrases, parties can limit 
interpretive difficulties and litigation over the content and scope of the agreement.  Id. 
27
 See id.  Arbitral institutions typically undertake two tasks:  (1) the promulgation of one or more sets of arbitral 
procedures that are akin to the rules of civil procedure, but which are much more flexible and tailored to the special 
issues that arise in arbitration, and (2) the administration of arbitrations that proceed under the institution’s published 
rules.  Notably, parties do not have to have their arbitrations administered and can instead choose to proceed ad hoc.  
Ad hoc arbitrations typically allow parties and arbitrators to adopt any procedures that appear necessary, subject to 
certain due process concerns.  Although inexperienced parties often prefer ad hoc arbitration because such 
procedures appear less expensive, most experts recommend administered arbitration, since the use of well 
recognized rules and the availability of an administering institution make the process smoother and more 
predictable, thus offsetting any money the parties might spend on fees paid to the institution.  For more on ad hoc 
and administered arbitration, see BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 147-51; JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶3-4 to 3-23 (2003).   
28
 See, e.g., AAA, Arbitration, available at http://www.adr.org/arb_med (listing range of rules addressing different 
areas of law). 
29
 While the principles of arbitral confidentiality mean that it is impossible to discover precise details or statistics 
about trust arbitration, it is possible to glean some information from judicial opinions addressing arbitration-related 
disputes.  Thus, for example, it is apparent that a number of disputes involving trusts have used both the AAA 
Commercial Arbitration Rules and the rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), which is the 
AAA’s international arm.  See AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules, effective June 1, 2009, available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440; ICDR International Dispute Resolution Procedures, effective June 1, 2009, 
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994; Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 
549 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 2008) (involving AAA rules in an external trust dispute); Municipality of San Juan v. 
Corporacion Para El Fomento Economico de la Ciudad Capital, 597 F. Supp. 2d 247, 248-49 (D. Puerto Rico 2008) 
(upholding terms of a pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration provision in a trust deed calling for arbitration under the 
rules of the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR)); New South Federal Savings Bank v. Anding, 414 
F. Supp. 2d 636, 646-47 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (upholding mandatory arbitration agreement in trust deed rider requiring 
AAA arbitration); Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. LP v. San Juan Basin Royalty Trust, 249 S.W.3d 34, 36, 38 
9 
 
Indeed, it is the very inapplicability of these standard clauses that has presumably led trust law 
commentators to suggest their own language.
30
 
While these observations may seem to explain how the current state of affairs has come 
to be, the truth is that those interested in drafting an enforceable arbitration provision in a trust do 
not need to use general commercial clauses as their starting point, nor do they need to draft new 
provisions entirely from scratch, since two of the world’s leading arbitral institutions – the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) – 
both offer specially drafted model arbitration provisions for use in trusts.  These provisions have 
been available for years, starting in 2003, when the AAA published model language (AAA 
Model Trust Clause)
31
 to be used in tandem with a dedicated set of arbitral procedures known as 
the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules.
32
  A second model arbitration clause became 
available in 2008, when the ICC published its own model language (ICC Model Trust Clause) 
following an extensive consultation process involving experts from around the world.
33
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Tex. App. 2007) (involving a post-dispute arbitration agreement concerning accountings and audits of the 
trust);Wilcox & Fetzer, Ltd. v. Corbett & Wilcox, No. Civ. A.2037-N, 2006 WL 2473665, at *1 (Del. Ch. 22 Aug. 
2006) (involving a pre-dispute arbitration agreement with a party external to a revocable trust).  Arbitrations 
involving trusts have also taken place under the Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
one of the world’s leading arbitral institutions.  See Newbridge Acquisition I, L.L.C. v. Grupo Corvi, S.A. de D.V., 
No. 02 Civ. 9839(JSR), 2003 WL 42007, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2003); Rules of Arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce, effective Jan. 1 2012, available at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/Court/Arbitration/other/2012_Arbitration%20and%20ADR%20Rules%20EN
GLISH.pdf [hereinafter ICC Arbitration Rules]. 
30
 Anecdotal evidence indicates that relatively few trusts currently contain arbitration provisions, which suggests that 
there is no standard ad hoc language that settlors can use as an exemplar. See Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 41; see 
also Horton, supra note 1, at *4; Katzen, supra note 14, at 119.   
31
 See AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, Model Clause, effective 1 June 2009 [hereinafter AAA Model Trust 
Clause], available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22005. 
32
 See AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, effective 1 June 2009 [hereinafter AAA Trust Arbitration Rules], 
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22005; see also AAA, Archived Rules,  
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29487 (containing various revisions).  The author analyzes the AAA Wills and Trusts 
Arbitration Rules in detail in a companion article.  See AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, supra; S.I. Strong, 
Mandatory Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes:  Are Special Procedures Necessary?, under consideration by 
ARB. INT’L (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, Procedures]. 
33





Shockingly, no practitioner or scholar has yet discussed either of these model arbitration 
provisions, nor has anyone used these clauses as a starting point for further drafting proposals.
34
  
This is deeply troubling, given that these provisions are perhaps the best models currently 
available for how to invoke mandatory trust arbitration. 
  Therefore, this Article will be the first analyze the AAA and ICC Model Trust Clauses 
in detail, considering both the differences between the two provisions as well as the extent to 
which each of the clauses addresses the various jurisprudential challenges facing mandatory trust 
arbitration.
35
  In so doing, this Article considers the AAA and ICC Model Trust Clauses as the 
starting point for future drafting efforts, just as practitioners would do if they were faced with a 
request to include a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust.
36
    
The structure of the discussion is as follows.  First, Section II discusses potential 
problems that arise with respect to mandatory arbitration of trust disputes.  Although a 
comprehensive evaluation of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article, it is nevertheless 
necessary to consider each issue briefly so as to identify the extent to which each of these 
elements can be positively affected by good drafting practices and to set the stage for later 
discussions about the effectiveness of the model arbitration clauses suggested by the AAA and 
the ICC.  Next, Section III considers how well the model clauses suggested by the AAA and the 
ICC address each of the various problems identified in Section II and outlines some of the 
additional measures introduced by each of the arbitral institutions.  Section IV concludes the 
Article with some final observations.     




 The few references to these model clauses that exist only mention the two institutional initiatives in passing.  See 
Horton, supra note 1, at *7; Hwang, supra note 8, at 83-84; Katzen, supra note 14, at 130-32.   
35
 See AAA Model Trust Clause, supra note 31; ICC Model Trust Clause, supra note 33. 
36
 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 11, at 37; AAA Model Trust Clause, supra note 31; ICC Model Trust Clause, 
supra note 33. 
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Before beginning, it is important to mention several background concerns.  First, parties 
need to understand at the outset that wholesale adoption of either the AAA or ICC Model Trust 
Clause will lead to an administered arbitration with that organization.
37
  However, parties who 
wish to proceed on an ad hoc basis or under the administration of a different institution may 
nevertheless look to these clauses for inspiration, since the proposed language can be modified 
for other uses.
38
   
Second, looking at the names of the two institutions, it might seem reasonable to 
conclude that the ICC Model Trust Clause is only suitable for use in international trusts while the 
AAA Model Trust Clause is only appropriate for matters involving domestic trusts.
39
  In fact, 
neither the ICC nor the AAA limit themselves geographically, which means that those who are 
looking for useful drafting tips should consider language contained in both the AAA and ICC 
Model Trust Clauses, regardless of whether the trust in question is domestic or international.
40
   
Third, the AAA and the ICC have decided to handle mandatory trust arbitration in 
slightly different manners.  Whereas the AAA has embraced a more holistic approach to the 
issue, not only adopting a model arbitration clause but also creating a new set of dedicated trust 
arbitration rules, the ICC has taken the view that it does not need to create a new set of arbitral 
procedures, since the standard ICC Arbitration Rules are considered flexible enough to address 
any trust-related disputes that might arise.
41
  Interestingly, the disparity in the way the AAA and 
the ICC address trust arbitration reflects a larger philosophical difference between the two 
institutions, in that the ICC currently has only one set of rules for all types of disputes while the 
                                                          
37
 See AAA Model Trust Clause, supra note 31; ICC Model Trust Clause, supra note 33. 
38
 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 11, at 37-38; AAA Model Trust Clause, supra note 31; ICC Model Trust 
Clause, supra note 33. 
39
 See AAA Model Trust Clause, supra note 31; ICC Model Trust Clause, supra note 33. 
40
 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 11, at 37; AAA Model Trust Clause, supra note 31; ICC Model Trust Clause, 
supra note 33. 
41
 See AAA Model Arbitration Clause, supra note 31; AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, supra note 32; ICC 
Model Trust Clause, supra note 33, Explanatory Notes 4-6; see also ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 29.    
12 
 
AAA offers a wide variety of subject-specific rules.
42
  However, neither approach is better or 
worse as a matter of principle.  Instead, parties simply choose the option that is most attractive to 
them.  Indeed, this kind of variation is welcomed in the arbitral community because it provides 




II. Trust in Arbitration?  Overcoming Doubts Regarding the Enforceability of an Arbitration  
 Provision Found in a Trust   
If Confucius were alive today, he might say trust lawyers are currently living through 
“interesting times,” at least with respect to mandatory trust arbitration.44  On the one hand, two 
recent and well-publicized state court cases – Diaz v. Bukey45 and Rachal v. Reitz46 – have both 
held that arbitration provisions located in a trust are unenforceable, although both decisions are 
currently under appeal.  While this would seem to bode ill for the future of mandatory trust 
arbitration, other developments suggest that the procedure is becoming increasingly accepted, 
both in the United States and elsewhere.  For example, a growing number of jurisdictions have 
demonstrated increased support for trust arbitration by enacting statutory provisions that either 
explicitly permit the use of mandatory arbitration provisions in trusts
47
 or implicitly authorize 
such measures.
48
  Furthermore, several older opinions that were once frequently cited for the 
proposition that arbitration of trust disputes is impermissible have all been abrogated 
                                                          
42
 See AAA, Arbitration, supra note 28 (listing range of rules addressing different areas of law); ICC Arbitration 
Rules, supra note 29. 
43
 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 11, at 58; LEW ET AL., supra note 27, ¶¶8-21 to 8-23.  
44
 An ancient Chinese curse, often attributed to Confucius, is for a person live through “interesting times.”  See 
David Louie, The State of Our Bar, 5 HAW. B.J. 4, 5 (Dec. 2001). 
45
 See Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 614-15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted, 257 P. 3d 
1129 (2011). 
46
 See Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review filed Sept. 8, 2011.   
47
 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-10205 (2011); Fla. Stat. Ann. §731.401 (2011); see also The Trusts (Guernsey) Law 
2007, supra note 17, §63; Trustee (Amendment) Bill 2011, supra note 17, §18; Murphy, supra note 15, at 662-64.  
48
 See Idaho Code Ann. §§15-8-101, 15-8-103 (2011); Wash. Rev. Code §§11.96A.010, 11.96A.030 (2012); UTC, 
supra note 7, §§111, 816(23); Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 10; see also supra note 7. 
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legislatively or judicially.  These cases include well-known decisions such as In re Jacobovitz’ 
Will,
49
 Meredith’s Estate50 and Schoneberger v. Oelze.51  Finally, a surprisingly large number of 
judicial decisions appear to take a positive view of mandatory trust arbitration, although these 
opinions have been largely overlooked in the legal literature.
52
   
While this diversity of opinion regarding the enforceability of mandatory trust arbitration 
would be enough to constitute “interesting times” on its own, trust lawyers must also contend 
with the fact that many U.S. states have not yet addressed issues in this area of law.  While some 
members of the trust bench and bar appear to take the view that the lack of subject-specific 
precedent should lead to a conservative approach toward arbitration, it is at least equally 
appropriate to conclude that general principles of arbitration law, including strong state and 
federal policies in favor of arbitration, will or should apply to trust disputes to the same extent 
that they do in other types of controversies.
53
  Indeed, numerous commentators have concluded 
                                                          
49
 Compare In re Jacobovitz’ Will, 295 N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 1968), with In re Blumenkrantz, 824 
N.Y.S.2d 884, 887 (Sur. Ct. Nassau Co. 2006). 
50
 Compare Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936), with In re Nestorovski Estate, 769 N.W. 2d 720, 732 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
51
 See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082-83 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §14-10205 (2011), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 
22, 2011).   
52
 See Radian Ins., Inc. v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 638 F. Supp. 2d 443, 458 (E.D. Pa. 2009); New South 
Federal Savings Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 643 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Roehl v. Ritchie, 54 Cal. Rptr. 3d 185 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007), declined to extend by Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), review 
granted and opinion superseded by Diaz v. Bukey, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011); see also Hastings v. Wilson, 516 
F.3d 1055, 1059 (8
th
 Cir. 2008); Bortrager v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 
1087, 1092 n.1 (8
th
 Cir. 2005); Contract Serv. Emp’ee Trust v. Davis, 55 F.3d 533, 535 (10th Cir. 1995); Reeves v. 
Tarvizian, 351 F.2d 889, 890-92 (1
st
 Cir. 1965); Stender v. Cardwell, Civ. No. 07-cv-02503-REB-MJW, 2009 WL 
3416904, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2009); Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Hollingsworth, 949 F. Supp. 77, 79 (D. Conn. 
1996); Masonry and Tile Contractors Assoc. of So. Nevada v. Jolley, Urga & Wirth, Ltd., 941 P.2d 486 (Nev. 
1997); Robin v. Doran, No. 392456, 2010 WL 728558, at *1 (Mass. Land Ct. Mar. 3, 2010).  But see Flores v. 
Transamerica Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Estate of Proceeding for the 
Appointment of a Guardian for Charlotte Radcliffe, N.Y. L.J., July 20, 2007, at 36 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County July 20, 
2007).  These decisions are discussed in more detail in Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 10.  Other relevant 
but often overlooked cases are cited throughout this Article.     
53
 See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1995); Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 
211; Horton, supra note 1, at *20. 
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not only that arbitration of internal trust disputes is well-suited to the needs of the parties,
54
 but 
that the use of a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust is an entirely legitimate means of 
invoking arbitration.
55
   
Admittedly, there are some members of the trust community who take a different view.
56
  
However, this is neither the time nor the place to enter into a detailed debate about the propriety 
of mandatory trust arbitration.  Instead, this Article considers whether and to what extent a settlor 
can positively affect the enforceability of a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust through an 
appropriate choice of language.  However, before entering into this discussion, it is necessary to 
outline the types of challenges facing contemporary settlors with respect to mandatory 
arbitration. 
Commentators considering the enforceability of arbitration provisions found in trusts 
have concluded that courts will uphold such provisions if: 
(1)  the court’s jurisdiction is not ousted in an unacceptable fashion;  
(2)  the clause purporting to be an arbitration clause is an agreement that is not 
inoperable, ineffective or incapable of being performed and covers the dispute at 
issue;  
(3)  the clause is binding on the party seeking to avoid arbitration;  
(4)  all interested parties, including unascertained, unborn and legally incompetent 
beneficiaries, are properly represented in the proceeding; and  




Although there is insufficient space in this Article to discuss each of these five factors in detail,
58
 
it is nevertheless useful to consider each issue briefly so as to demonstrate the extent to which 
each of these elements can be positively affected by good drafting practices and to set the stage 
                                                          
54
 See ACTEC, supra note 2, at 5; Bosques-Hernández, supra note 19, at 6; Buckle & Olsen, supra note 8, at 649.   
55
 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
56
 See ACTEC, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the “blinding prejudice” to arbitration in contemporary trust and 
estates practice). 
57
 See Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 209; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
58
 The author has conducted a more comprehensive study of these issues elsewhere.  See Strong, Two Bodies 
Collide, supra note 10. 
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for later discussions about the effectiveness of the model arbitration clauses suggested by the 
AAA and the ICC.   
 
A. No impermissible ouster of the court’s jurisdiction   
Courts have traditionally exercised uniquely broad powers over the administration of trusts,
59
 
making concerns about the possible ouster of judicial jurisdiction particularly pressing.  Several 
possible rationales can be used to justify these broad jurisdictional powers.  One is a concern that 
allowing a trust dispute to be resolved through any means other than litigation could 
disadvantage one or more of the parties, typically through the non-application of a mandatory 
provision of law.
60
  However, closer analysis suggests that arbitration does not violate any of the 
principles underlying these mandatory rules of law.  This is because: 
[a]part from the anti-dead-hand rules, the mandatory rules of trust law have a 
prevailingly intent-serving purpose.  They facilitate rather than prohibit; their 
policy is cautionary and protective.  These rules force the settlor to be precise 
about the tradeoffs between benefiting the trustee and benefiting the beneficiary; 
hence they aim to clarify and channel, rather than to defeat the settlor’s intent.  
Trust terms that would excuse bad faith, or dispense with fiduciary obligation, or 
conceal the trust from its beneficiaries would make the trust obligation illusory, 
effectively allowing the trustee to loot the trust. . . .  The intent-serving mandatory 
rules merely require a settlor who has such an improbable intent to articulate it 
unambiguously, in order to prevent the settlor from stumbling into that result 
through misunderstanding or imposition.  Accordingly, apart from the anti-dead-





Anti-dead-hand rules can be set aside as having little, if anything, to do with arbitration, 
since they typically focus on (1) issues relating to future interests, as reflected in the Rule 
Against Perpetuities and similar provisions that give effect to the desire to promote the 
                                                          
59
 See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 22, at 552-55; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 19, at 662. 
60
 See Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 215-17; Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 10. 
61
 John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1126-27 (2004) [hereinafter 
Langbein, Mandatory Rules].   
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alienability of land, and (2) the principle that the trust must benefit the beneficiaries.
62
  Rules 
requiring the settlor to indicate clearly his or her intentions regarding the relationship between 
the trustee and the beneficiaries are also not hindered by arbitration, not only because arbitration 
does not affect the balance of power between parties but also because arbitration clauses already 
need to be clear to be enforceable as a matter of arbitration law.  Indeed, the requirement for 
clarity is often higher with respect to arbitration agreements than with respect to other types of 
agreements.
63
  Therefore, an arbitration provision that clearly reflects the settlor’s desires would 
not appear to oust the jurisdiction of the court in any impermissible manner vis-à-vis the various 
mandatory rules of law.   
Another rationale relating to the broad jurisdictional powers of the courts focuses on the 
idea that access to the courts is necessary as a means of helping protect beneficiaries from 
overreaching from the trustee.
64
  Thus, for example, it is usually “a non-excludable feature of a 
trust that the trustee’s administration of the fund must be, directly or indirectly, subject to the 
supervision of the court.”65   
The key principle here “is that the trustee must be sufficiently accountable so that his 
status as the non-beneficial owner of the assets vested in him is practically real.”66  However, 
“effective accountability does not mean that the trustees can be accountable only to the court 
rather than to some other body which has power to enquire into the trustees’ administration of 
                                                          
62
 See id. at 1110 n.33; see also Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2180, 2244 (2011); John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?  Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to Direct 
Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 396 (2010); Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 19, at 650-51.   
63
 See BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 585.  
64
 Concerns about overreaching by the settlor are addressed through principles of arbitrability.  See infra notes 145-
65 and accompanying text; see also Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083-84 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (noting a 
settlor “may not unilaterally strip trust beneficiaries of their right to access the courts absent their agreement”), 
superseded by statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-10205 (2011), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. CA-SA 10-0262, 
2011 WL 601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2011). 
65
 Fox, supra note 15, at 22. 
66
 Id. at 24. 
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the fund and to require them to abide by the terms of the trust instrument.”67  Instead, there may 
be other, equally effective means of curbing any abuse by the trustee, of which arbitration may 
be one.  Objections from the beneficiaries regarding the procedure used “would only have weight 
if the beneficiaries were denied any effective means of enforcing their interests against the 
trustees.  If the ADR procedure had effective machinery for enforcing the outcome of the 
determination against the trustees, then it seems that this objection would not hold.”68   
Experts have also concluded that arbitration does not impermissibly not oust the 
jurisdiction of the court because judges retain the final word about the propriety of an arbitration 
as a result of their ability to undertake judicial review of the award at the end of the arbitral 
process.
69
  While this procedure is not the same as an appeal, since judicial review does not 
allow the court to reconsider the merits of the award, the process still provides the parties with 
significant procedural protections.
70
  Since the primary concern regarding the ouster of the courts 
appears to be procedural in nature,
71
 commentators have therefore concluded that mandatory 
arbitration does not impermissibly oust the jurisdiction of the court but “merely postpone[s] the 




                                                          
67
 Id.  
68
 Id. at 24-25; see also ACTEC, supra note 2, at 13-14.    
69
 See Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 210; Olivier Caprasse, Objective Arbitrability of Corporate Disputes – 
Belgium and France, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 79, 86 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al., eds., 2011). 
70
 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 
2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention];  9 U.S.C. §10 (2011); see also BORN, ICA, supra note 4, 
at 2649-55, 2865-70.  
71
 See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 61, at 1110 n.33, 1126-27; Fox, supra note 15, at 24; Strong, Two 
Bodies Collide, supra note 10. 
72
 Lloyd & Pratt, supra note 15, at 18; see also ACTEC, supra note 2, at 15 (noting “the argument that arbitration 
denies access to court died with Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001)”); Strong, Two Bodies Collide, 
supra note 10. 
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B. An arbitration clause that is operable, effective and capable of performance   
The second issue to consider involves the arbitration provision itself.  For a mandatory 
arbitration provision found in a trust to be enforceable, “the clause purporting to be an arbitration 
clause . . . [must be] an agreement which is not inoperable, ineffective or incapable of being 
performed.”73    
 The issue here involves the expectation held in many jurisdictions that an arbitration 
agreement should reflect certain contractual qualities.
74
  While this requirement is not 
universal,
75
 it is still often the case that an arbitration provision located within a larger document 
such as a trust is only considered enforceable if the larger document is contractual in nature.
76
   
This can create several problems.  First, trusts are typically only signed by the settlor, not 
by other parties.
77
  Second, trusts do not involve the exchange of consideration, which is 
problematic in jurisdictions that hold that “[a]rbitration rests on an exchange of promises.”78 
Although the signature and consideration requirements have proven fatal to mandatory 
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 Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 209.  The dispute in question must also fall within the scope of the arbitration 
provision, but that issue is commonly given to the arbitrators.  See BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 852-83.   
74
 See BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 640-42.   
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 See New South Federal Savings Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 643 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (noting “[m]utuality 
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ARBITRATION IN GERMANY:  THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 957, 1002 (Karl Heinz Böckstiegel et al. eds., 2007); 
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Langbein, Commercial Trusts, supra note 1, at 185; Langbein, Contractarian, supra note 19, at 627; Strong, Two 
Bodies Collide, supra note 10.  Interestingly, authorities emphasizing the donative nature of trusts commonly 
exclude commercial trusts from their consideration, suggesting that commercial trusts may be treated as being 
primarily contractual, an approach that would be beneficial to the arbitration analysis.  See id.  While it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to differentiate between commercial and other kinds of trusts, such an analysis would be useful.  
See id. 
77
 Oral trusts are permitted in some cases, but are increasingly rare.  See DAVID HAYTON ET AL., UNDERHILL AND 
HAYTON LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES ¶12.1 (18
th
 ed. 2010). 
78
 Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), superseded by statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§14-10205 (2011), as recognized in Jones v. Fink, No. CA-SA 10-0262, 2011 WL 601598 (Ariz. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 
2011).   
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arbitration of trusts on occasion,
79
 courts and commentators have identified a number of ways to 
overcome both problems.  However, the approach varies according to the party’s relationship to 
the trust.   
The situation is easiest with respect to trustees, since settlors can create explicit 
contractual relationships with such parties, either through language in the trust itself or in a side 
agreement, and can require the trustee to sign the document in question.
80
  Problems regarding 
consideration are typically overcome in one of three ways:  either (1) the trustee is paid for his or 
her efforts (indeed, it is rare for a trustee to act gratuitously these days);
81
 (2) the trustee is said to 
have consented to the terms of the trust, including any rights and responsibilities thereunder, by 
accepting the trust appointment;
82
 or (3) the jurisdiction in question has concluded that there is 
no need for mutual consideration to establish an agreement to arbitrate in the context of a trust.
83
   
Disputes involving beneficiaries are more difficult.  While judicial or legislative 
elimination of any need for mutual consideration would be equally useful in these cases, it is 
more difficult for a settlor to draft the trust instrument in such a way that the requirements of a 
traditional contractual relationship are met, since beneficiaries neither sign the trust instrument 
nor accept any burdens thereunder.  However, commentators have concluded that: 
a trust deed could be drafted in such a way that benefiting from the trust would be 
deemed an agreement to submit trust disputes to arbitration.  By accepting the 
gifts or invoking any rights under the trust deed, the beneficiaries would be 
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 See Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review filed Sept. 8, 2011; Diaz v. 
Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 612-13  (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), petition for review granted, 257 P.3d 1129 (2011).   
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 See Bosques-Hernández, supra note 19, at 12; Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 221-22; Wüstemann, supra note 3, 
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82
 See ICC Model Trust Clause, supra note 33; HAYTON ET AL., supra note 77, ¶11.83; Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, 
at 218; Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 44. 
83
 See New South Federal Savings Bank v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 643 (S.D. Miss. 2006); Horton, supra note 
1, at *25-38 (suggesting the U.S. Supreme Court has described the FAA “as facilitating goals that do not require an 
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deemed to agree to settle any dispute in accordance with the arbitration agreement 
contained in the trust deed.
84
   
 
U.S. courts have described this technique as constituting a “conditional transfer.”85  At its 
core, conditional transfer holds that certain provisions found in the trust may be binding on 
beneficiaries if the beneficiary’s “rights” in the corpus of the trust are seen as “wholly 
derivative” of the settlor’s “right to pass her property to the persons of her choosing.”86  Because 
the beneficiary has rights in the trust only because the settlor granted those rights, the settlor is 
allowed to condition acceptance of the rights in the trust (i.e., the benefit under the trust) on 
acceptance of the mandatory arbitration provisions in the trust.
87
  Notably, the settlor does not 
have to refer explicitly to the concept of conditional transfer in the arbitration provision for the 
court to find that the doctrine applies, although it may be useful, as a matter of best practices, for 
the trust to include language invoking the doctrine so as to boost the likelihood that the 
arbitration provision will be found operable, effective and capable of performance.  Although the 
concept of conditional transfer may be sufficient to overcome the need for a signature, the lack 
of a formal signature can also be addressed through various theories regarding the participation 
of non-signatories in arbitration.
88
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 Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 45.  This is the approach adopted by the ICC in its model arbitration clause.  See ICC 
Model Trust Clause, supra note 33; see infra notes 247-59 and accompanying text.     
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 See American Cancer Soc., St. Louis Division v. Hammerstein, 631 S.W. 2d 858, 864 (Mo. App. 1981) (stating 
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C. An arbitration clause that is binding on the party seeking to avoid arbitration  
The third issue to discuss is whether an arbitration clause found in the trust is binding on the 
party against whom the provision is to be used.
89
  Rather than focusing on requirements 
regarding the form of the arbitration provision, this analysis considers whether there is adequate 
consent to support arbitration.  Two types of consent must be considered:  that of the settlor and 
that of parties other than the settlor. 
  
1. Settlor consent   
In some ways, it may seem strange to ask whether a settlor has consented to arbitration, since the 
settlor is the one who created the trust with the mandatory arbitration provision in the first place.  
However, settlor consent is essentially what is at issue when a party challenges a trust on 
grounds such as undue influence, lack of capacity, fraud, duress, forgery or mistake.  In those 
cases, the claim is that neither the underlying document (i.e., the trust) nor the arbitration 
agreement found in the trust ever came into effect and that the dispute therefore should be heard 
in court.
90
   
Some specialists in trust law have differentiated between claims arising under a trust and 
those challenging the existence of the trust itself, with only the former being considered 
appropriate for arbitration.
91
  This appears to be based on practices used in other areas of trust 
law, where “courts often void entire testamentary instruments, or, at a minimum, the dispositive 
sections” when it is too difficult to separate clauses that were created through improper means 
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from those that were not.
92
  However, adopting this approach in cases involving arbitration is 
problematic, given the arbitral principle of separability.
93
   
The concept of separability states that challenges to the validity or existence of a contract 
in which an arbitration agreement is found do not affect the validity or existence of the 
arbitration agreement itself.
94
  The doctrine arose because courts and commentators recognized 
early on that the effectiveness of the arbitral regime would be in jeopardy if parties could avoid 
arbitration simply by alleging certain types of contract defenses.
95
   
The two primary precedents regarding separability are Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Manufacturing Co.
96
 and Buckeye Check Cashing Inc. v. Cardegna.
97
  The essential 
holding of Prima Paint is that “claims of fraudulent inducement, directed at the underlying 
contract and capable of rendering it voidable, [do] not impeach the arbitration clause contained 
in that contract.”98  Buckeye Check Cashing extended this basic principle to “cases involving 
claims that the underlying contract was void or illegal.”99  Thus, “a challenge to the validity of 
the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the 
arbitrator.”100  This holding applies “regardless of whether the challenge is brought in state or 
federal court.”101   
                                                          
92
 Katzen, supra note 14, at 123-24. 
93
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Although the basic principles of separability are relatively easy to grasp, the nuances can 
become quite complicated and are beyond the scope of this Article.
102
  Instead, the only relevant 
question for this discussion is whether and to what extent U.S. courts will apply the doctrine of 
separability to disputes involving mandatory trust arbitration.  Interestingly, a variety of 
approaches have arisen. 
For example, some judges take the view that the principle of separability does not apply 
to trust disputes.  Thus, the court in Spahr v. Secco concluded that: 
the analytical formula developed in Prima Paint cannot be applied with precision 
when a party contends that an entire contract containing an arbitration provision is 
unenforceable because he or she lacked the mental capacity to enter into the 
contract.  Unlike a claim of fraud in the inducement, which can be directed at 
individual provisions in a contract, a mental capacity challenge can logically be 




Because challenges based on lack of mental capacity “naturally go[ ] to both the entire 
contract and the specific agreement to arbitrate in the contract,” the court decided that a dispute 
based on mental incapacity should be heard in court, not in arbitration.
104
  Although this may 
appear to be a clear and persuasive interpretation of the principle of separability in trust-related 
disputes, the decision was handed down prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Buckeye 
Cashing and therefore may no longer be good law.
105
   
A second approach was exemplified in Regions Bank v. Britt.
106
  Although this challenge 
was not based on the alleged incapacity of the settlor, as was the case in Spahr, it did attack the 
underlying validity or existence of the trust in which the arbitration provision was found on other 
                                                          
102
 For more detailed analysis of this issue, see BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 359-91; Strong, Two Bodies Collide, 
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 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10
th
 Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).  The arbitration provision in question was in an external 
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  In this case, which was handed down after Buckeye Check Cashing, the court held 
that questions regarding the substantive validity of the arbitration provision could and more 
properly should be heard in arbitration, based on the rule in Prima Paint.
108
   
A third approach to separability was seen in Weizmann Institute of Science v. Neschis, 
which considered whether and to what extent an arbitral award rendered in Liechtenstein should 
be given preclusive effect in a U.S. court proceeding involving claims that were very similar to 
those determined in the arbitration.
109
  One of the issues raised in the arbitration involved the 
mental capacity of the settlor, who was alleged to have been suffering from Alzheimer’s disease 
at the time he established several foundations (“stiftung”), which are Liechtenstein’s version of a 
trust.
110
  The arbitration provision in question was located in the charter establishing the 
foundation.
111
    
Interestingly, at no point did the court in Weizmann Institute take the position that issues 
of settlor capacity could not be heard in arbitration.
112
  Instead, the court refused to hear 
argument on matters relating to the mental capacity of the settlor, based on principles of 
collateral estoppel.
113
  This suggests that a per se rule barring arbitration of trust disputes 
involving the mental capacity of the settlor would not be appropriate, despite the analysis in 
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  Instead, the rule in Regions Bank  appears to conform more closely with the 




2. Consent of parties other than the settlor  
Consent issues are not limited to concerns relating to the settlor.  In fact, the more commonly 
analyzed question is whether a mandatory arbitration provision can be considered binding on 
persons other than the settlor (i.e., trustees and beneficiaries).
116
     
 The analysis here is similar to that regarding the operability and effectiveness of the 
arbitration agreement.
117
  An arbitration provision found in a trust is considered operable with 
respect to trustees to the extent that those persons agree to act under the terms of the trust.
118
  The 
concept of conditional transfer yields a similar result vis-à-vis beneficiaries.
119
  These same 
techniques can also be used to demonstrate these parties’ consent to be bound by the arbitration 
provision.
120
   
However, commentators have raised an interesting issue with regard to the possible 
means of binding beneficiaries to a mandatory arbitration provision found in a trust.  Although 
conditional transfer is considered an entirely legitimate mechanism and sufficient to achieve the 
                                                          
114
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necessary ends, some people have attempted to bolster the effectiveness of an arbitral clause 
through the use of a forfeiture (in terrorem) provision.
121
 
In terrorem provisions typically state that any party who challenges a trust or will forfeits 
any rights he or she may have under the instrument.  In the context of mandatory arbitration, 
forfeiture is triggered by a challenge to the use of arbitration to resolve a particular dispute.
122
 
Although such provisions obviously provide a strong incentive for beneficiaries to agree to 
arbitration, in terrorem provisions are problematic for several reasons.
123
   
First, in terrorem clauses are by no means universally embraced, even as a general 
matter.  Indeed, courts often refuse to enforce such provisions if a party has probable cause to 
bring the claim.
124
  Second, in terrorem clauses are particularly suspect in the context of 
mandatory arbitration, since threatening to revoke a benefit under the trust through a forfeiture 
provision could be seen as “vitiat[ing] the freedom of will required to contract, and so 
render[ing] the [arbitration] agreement voidable.”125  Third, an in terrorem provision could be 
considered an impermissible attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the court and hence be void ab 
initio.
126
  Therefore, while some commentators take the view that requiring a legatee to “forfeit 
her interest should she decline to respect the testator’s wishes with respect to arbitration of will 
[or trust] contests should not discourage any truly meritorious . . . contest [, since s]uch a contest 
                                                          
121
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may still be brought,”127 the better view appears to be that settlors should avoid trying to force 
beneficiaries into arbitration through use of a forfeiture clause.
128
    
 
D. Proper representation of the parties  
The fourth concern relating to mandatory arbitration of trust disputes involves the need to ensure 
that all interested parties are properly represented in the proceedings.
129
  Here, the issue is how 
best to protect the rights of beneficiaries who may be unascertained, unborn or legally 
incompetent at the time the dispute arises.
130
   
In litigated disputes, “the court has to appoint a person to represent the interests of such 
beneficiaries, and, even then, any compromise of the litigation has to be approved by the 
court.”131  Appointed representatives either share a common interest with the absent beneficiaries 
(a practice known as “virtual representation”) or have no independent interest in the dispute 
itself.
132
  Minors and other legally incompetent persons (such as the mentally incapacitated) 
typically have guardians (either a parent or a guardian ad litem) already in place.
133
   
The question therefore becomes whether and to what extent these sort of representative 
mechanisms can be used in arbitration.  To some extent, the answer may depend on whether the 
trust instrument specifically describes the representative mechanism that is to be used.  Thus, for 
example, it has been said that: 
[t]here appears to be no reason why the court would not grant a stay [of litigation] 
to the trustee on the sole ground that the beneficiary is not properly represented in 
the arbitration.  If the arbitration provision is properly drawn to provide for 
                                                          
127
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adequate representation, then the child [or other beneficiary] should be bound to 




However, in drafting such a provision, the settlor should be sure to: 
provide how incapacitated, unascertained and unborn beneficiaries can come (or 
be brought) forward to make their claims . . . . The arbitral tribunal could 
determine who should be served with notice of the arbitration, in the same way as, 




Furthermore, “[t]o avoid problems the trust deed should provide for payment of [representatives] 
out of the trust fund.”136   
Trustees who are not given explicit powers in the trust to appoint virtual or other 
representatives could attempt to do so based on their residual discretionary powers to resolve 
trust disputes.  This approach has been discussed less by commentators and may therefore be 
more open to debate.  However, any efforts by trustees in this regard would likely be bolstered 
by any statutory provisions allowing nonjudicial means of dispute resolution.
137
   
Other potential problems exist with respect to the proper representation of parties to a 
mandatory arbitration.  For example, questions may arise as to whether the arbitral tribunal has 
the ability to approve the settlement of a trust dispute in cases involving appointed 
representatives or whether that power can be exercised only by a court.
138
  While arbitrators are 
entirely competent to enter an award on an agreed settlement as a matter of arbitration law,
139
 
some courts could oppose similar actions in the trust context on the grounds that the judicial duty 
                                                          
134
 Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 202-23; see also Hayton, supra note 19, at 15-18.   
135
 Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 223. Typically, “trustees must take all reasonable practiable [sic] steps” to 
provide notice to actual and potential beneficiaries, even those who only have a possibility of taking under a 
discretionary trusts.  HAYTON ET AL., supra note 77, ¶56.11. 
136
 Hayton, supra note 19, at 72; see also Hayton, supra note 19, at 17.   
137
 See supra note 7. 
138
 See Hayton, supra note 19, at 13-15. 
139
 See BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 2437-38.  
29 
 
to approve voluntary disposition of a trust dispute is non-derogable.
140
  However, some 
commentators take the view that the use of representative devices in “nonjudicial dispute 
resolution procedures has simplified the settlement process and made it possible to finalize 
nonjudicial dispute resolution agreements without having to seek court approval.”141 
Challenges could also arise as to the competency of a particular representative.  However, 
it has been said that “[o]ne can leave it to the good sense of the arbitrator to provide for due 
process and a fair hearing by appointing appropriate skilled independent persons to represent 
minors and unborn and unascertained beneficiaries.”142  
Finally, questions could arise as to whether a representative needs to be appointed in any 
particular set of circumstances.  For example, a representative might not need to be appointed for 
a minor if the minor is receiving a benefit under the trust, since consent to receiving a benefit is 
not necessary in some jurisdictions.
143
  However, a representative would be necessary in cases 
where a conflict of interest existed between a minor beneficiary and his or her natural 
guardian.
144
    
 
E. A subject matter that is arbitrable   
Finally, for a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust to be enforceable, “the subject matter of 
the dispute [must be] arbitrable.”145  The term “arbitrability” here is being used in its 
international sense and describes which disputes can be heard in arbitration and which are 
                                                          
140
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reserved to the exclusive purview of the courts.
146
  Although national and international laws on 
arbitration clearly contemplate the possibility that certain issues are non-arbitrable, seldom are 
the parameters of non-arbitrability firmly and clearly drawn.
147
  Cross-border disputes, including 
those involving individual U.S. states, can become particularly complicated as a result of various 




Initially one might think that statutes allowing nonjudicial resolution of various trust-
related disputes would be useful in this analysis.
149
  Certainly these sorts of provisions are 
helpful in some regards, most particularly by suggesting that certain rights relating to trusts are 
freely disposable and thus not inherently non-arbitrable.
150
  However, most of the relevant 
legislation is written in such a way that it is not clear whether the statutes apply to mandatory 
arbitration provisions found in trusts.
151
  Instead, the legislation could be interpreted as applying 
only to arbitration agreements entered into by a trustee after the creation of the trust.  
The absence of clearly controlling legislation in most jurisdictions means that the analysis 
must focus on other, more general principles of law.
152
  One way of looking at the issue is to 
consider that, at its core, arbitrability focuses on whether the rights in question are freely 
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disposable by the parties.
153
  Because “the freedom to dispose of one’s rights . . . implies the 
possibility to renounce such rights,”154 it is appropriate to ask whether beneficiaries can dispose 
of all or some of their rights.  As it turns out, beneficiaries can disclaim any benefits they are 
entitled receive under a trust, suggesting that beneficiaries’ rights are freely disposable.155  While 
some difficulties could arise to the extent that trust law limits beneficiaries’ ability to terminate a 
trust created for their benefit or to alter its terms, this concern appears inapposite because 
mandatory trust arbitration does not challenge the terms of the trust so much as it upholds 
them.
156
   
There are many other aspects of the arbitrability analysis that could be discussed, but the 
issue can become quite complicated and will not be addressed here, primarily because questions 
of arbitrability are ultimately decided by courts rather than by parties.
157
  Therefore, there is little 
that a settlor can do during the drafting stage to affect the outcome of an arbitrability analysis.
158
   
However, there is one point regarding arbitrability that should be noted at this point, since 
it affects the drafting process.  Whereas courts at one time considered arbitrability on a broad 
scale, treating entire subject matters in a similar manner, judges are now adopting an increasingly 
nuanced approach to the question of arbitrability, sometimes allowing some claims within a 
certain general subject matter to go forward in arbitration while disallowing others.
159
  Since 
there have been some suggestions already made about the non-arbitrability of certain types of 
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trust-related disputes, it appears likely that trust law will have to address the question of this sort 
of “limited arbitrability” at some point in the near future.160  
While no settlor wants to have even some part of a trust struck as being unenforceable, it 
is important to understand that a judicial determination that one type of claim is non-arbitrable 
does not affect the validity of the arbitration provision as a whole.
161
  There is, as it were, no 
“penalty” for over-inclusiveness on the part of the drafter.  Instead, the arbitration provision as a 
whole survives a determination of limited non-arbitrability, with courts or arbitrators simply 
severing the problematic claim or claims and allowing arbitrable issues to be determined in 
arbitration and non-arbitrable issues to be determined in litigation.
162
   
Although the arbitrability analysis may seem complicated, it should be emphasized that 
most commentators have concluded that most, if not all, internal trust disputes are or should be 
arbitrable.
163
  While further research on the question of limited arbitrability is needed,
164
 a rule of 
general arbitrability is not only consistent with principles of trust law but also with the prevailing 
trend toward increased arbitrability in other areas of law.
165
   
 
III. The Empowered Settlor:  How Arbitral Best Practices Address Trust Law Concerns  
 Regarding Arbitration  
Given the number of jurisprudential problems facing mandatory arbitration of internal trust 
disputes, it is easy to see why some settlors hesitate before placing an arbitration provision in a 
                                                          
160
 For example, commentators have already questioned the arbitrability of claims challenging the existence of the 
trust.  See supra notes 90-115 and accompanying text.  Other areas of concern include claims involving certain 
statutory rights, such as those based on marital or succession law.  See Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 10 
(discussing elective shares); Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 45-46 (discussing forced heirship). 
161
 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 11, at 130. 
162
 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 221 (1985); see also  BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 
767. 
163
 See Cohen & Staff, supra note 2, at 223-26; Lloyd & Pratt, supra note 15, at 18; Strong, Two Bodies Collide, 
supra note 10; Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 55-56.    
164
 See Strong, Two Bodies Collide, supra note 10. 
165
 See BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 837-41. 
33 
 
trust.  However, the preceding section suggests a number of ways that these issues can be 
mitigated or resolved through proper drafting.  Additional techniques are discussed below.      
 
A. Background considerations   
Drafting an arbitration provision for the first time can be a daunting task.
166
  However, 
newcomers can take heart in the fact that no special terms of art are needed to demonstrate an 
intent to arbitrate.
167
  Indeed, a simple provision stating that “the parties agree to arbitrate any 
and all disputes arising out of or in connection with this trust” may be sufficient to trigger 
arbitration of a wide variety of trust-related disputes.
168
  Settlors can also create narrower 
categories of matters that are to be subject to arbitration, although experts caution against overly 




While parties do not need to use any particular language to reflect an intent to arbitrate, 
some (though not all) states may require the document in which an arbitral provision exists to 
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reflect certain contractual qualities.
170
  Due to the relatively novel nature of mandatory trust 
arbitration, drafters may not know in advance which jurisdictions will require an arbitration 
provision to be in a contract-like document.  However, there are several ways to anticipate how a 
judge might rule on this particular issue.       
First, the jurisdiction in question may have already established whether a trust is a 
contract in contexts other than arbitration.
171
  Although these precedents might not apply to 
mandatory trust arbitration,
172
 settlors should determine whether such cases exist, since some 
courts seeking persuasive authority could find them relevant.
173
 
Second, some states may require a claim involving a trust to be framed as a breach of 
trust or fiduciary duty while other jurisdictions permit such allegations to be framed as a breach 
of contract.
174
  Parties may find that courts in the latter category are more inclined to uphold an 
arbitration provision found in a trust. 
Third, some state arbitration statutes speak of an “arbitration contract” while others refer 
to an “arbitration agreement.”175  Courts faced with the second type of statute could rely on the 
breadth of the language to allow mandatory trust arbitration even if a trust is not considered a 
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174
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  Furthermore, commentators have suggested that most trusts are governed by 
the FAA rather than state arbitration statutes and that the goals of the FAA do not require an 
arbitration provision to be located in a contract-like document.
177
  While there is no way to know 
definitively whether a judge hearing the dispute will consider the difference in statutory language 
relevant, settlors may nevertheless find it useful to know what the relevant standard is.  Notably, 
when considering this issue, parties to international or interstate trusts must take care to 
undertake a proper conflict of laws analysis to identify the law that controls this issue, since the 
law that governs the merits of a dispute does not always govern the interpretation or validity of 
the arbitration agreement.
178
   
While these suggestions may be helpful, they obviously do not provide settlors with any 
guarantees.  Therefore, absent clear statutory or judicial authority that a mandatory arbitration 
provision in a trust is enforceable,
179
 settlors should err on the side of caution and draft their 
arbitration provisions to maximize contract-like elements.   
Several techniques can be used to help fulfill these sorts of requirements.  For example, 
settlors may “incorporat[e] a mandatory arbitration agreement provision into a separate contract 
rather than into the actual trust agreement.”180  Such an approach could be effective even in 
jurisdictions that “dismiss[ ] the contractual nature of trust agreements,” since those regimes 
nevertheless “allow[ ] for a separate contract between the grantor and the trustee.”181   
                                                          
176
 See id.;  see also Duve, supra note 75, at 1002; Schwartz & Konrad, supra note 75, at 19-20. 
177
 See Horton, supra note 1, at *25-38. 
178
 See Gerard Meijer & Josefina Guzman, The International Recognition of an Arbitration Clause in the Articles of 
Association of a Company, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR, supra note 69, at 117, 125; see also In re Revocation of 
Revocable Trust of Fellman, 604 A.2d 263, 269 (Pa. Super. 1992) (Johnson, J., dissenting); von Segesser, supra 
note 3, at 22-23; Wüstemann, supra note 3, at 47.   
179
 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §14-10205 (2011); Fla. Stat. Ann. §731.401 (2011); New South Federal Savings Bank 
v. Anding, 414 F. Supp. 2d 636, 646-47 (S.D. Miss. 2005). 
180
 Bruyere & Marino, supra note 14, at 364. 
181
 Id.; see also Bosques-Hernández, supra note 19, at 7. 
36 
 
While side agreements may be effective with respect to the trustee, they may not be 
applicable in situations where the settlor wishes to bind the beneficiaries.  In those cases, the 
focus needs to be on the language found in the trust itself.  Different provisions may be 
necessary, depending on whether the settlor anticipates (1) claims being brought primarily by the 
beneficiaries against the trustee, (2) claims being asserted among the beneficiaries or (3) both.
182
  
A settlor concerned about the first situation may be able to create a binding arbitration provision 
in the trust itself if he: 
on behalf of himself and the beneficiaries deriving their interests through him, 
expressly contracts in the trust instrument with the trustee, on behalf of itself and 
its successors in title, that in consideration of undertaking the office of trustee (for 
the benefit of the settlor, the beneficiaries and itself) any breach of trust claim 








Settlors concerned about claims being asserted among the beneficiaries would need to 
amend the proposed language to incorporate claims of this nature.
185
  In so doing, drafters should 
consider whether they can establish some form of mutual consideration that would be acceptable 
under the law governing the interpretation of the arbitration provision or whether the doctrine of 
conditional transfer will be sufficient to overcome the need for consideration.
186
  
One item that is often overlooked is the need to include proper contractual language 
regarding the privacy and confidentiality of the proceedings.  Although many people assume that 
                                                          
182
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arbitration is a private and confidential process, most national and international laws are silent in 
this regard.
187
  Parties must therefore include specific language regarding confidentiality in their 
arbitration agreement or agree to abide by institutional rules that guarantee similar protections.
188
 
While it is certainly possible to incorporate all the necessary elements into arbitration 
clauses drafted on a case-by-case basis, experts do not recommend this sort of ad hoc approach, 
since the use of non-standard terms can lead to interpretive difficulties and litigation over the 
content and scope of the agreement.
189
  Instead, specialists in arbitration recommend use of a 
model arbitration clause, tailored to the parties’ individual needs.190 
The best language is often found in the model clauses published by reputable arbitration 
institutions.
191
  However, parties that do not want to have an administered arbitration should take 
care, since blanket acceptance of those clauses will result in an administered proceeding with 
that institution.
192
  This is not to say that institutional clauses cannot be useful even to parties that 
wish to proceed ad hoc, since those clauses can provide inspiration on how to structure an ad hoc 
provision as well as precise language that has been well-tested in courts.
193
  Nevertheless, parties 
should always confirm that the clause in question really does reflect best practices in drafting 
before relying on it, since the mere fact that a clause has been published by an arbitral institution 
is not proof of the efficacy of that provision.
194
  To that end, the following subsection considers 
model arbitration clauses provided by two leading arbitral institutions, the AAA and the ICC, so 
                                                          
187
 See BORN, ICA, supra note 4, at 2253.   
188
 See id. at 2265-69. 
189
 See BORN, DRAFTING, supra note 11, at 37-38.   
190
 See id. 
191
 See id. at 37.   
192
 Notably, “many experienced international arbitration practitioners prefer institutional arbitration to ad hoc 
arbitration, because of the heightened predictability, stability, and institutional expertise provided by the former” as 
well as other benefits.  See id. at 45.  
193
 See id.  
194
 See id. at 37-38, 57-58. 
38 
 
as to determine the extent to which the language actually addresses the special needs of the trust 
industry.  
 
B. Model Arbitration Clauses Relating to Trust Disputes   
1. The AAA Model Trust Clause  
The AAA was the first organization to address the particular challenges associated with trust 
arbitration, publishing the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules in 2003 along with the AAA 
Model Trust Clause.
 195
  By 2003, the AAA already had some experience with trust arbitration as 
a result of its work with the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans (IFEBP) in 
enacting several trust-related rule sets involving pension trusts.
196
  However, use of those rules is 
explicitly permitted by federal regulation and therefore does not involve the same kind of 
drafting issues that exist in other types of trusts.
197
  Therefore, the proposed model clauses 
associated with those rules will not be discussed herein. 
Notably, the AAA’s efforts with respect to standard trust arbitration have won the 
approval of the drafters of the UTC and are cited in the UTC as an appropriate means of 
invoking arbitration.
198
  The following discussion introduces the text of the clause itself and 
considers how well the AAA addresses the various problems associated with mandatory 
arbitration of trust disputes. 
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  a. Text and context 
The text of the AAA Model Trust Clause states:  
[i]n order to save the cost of court proceedings and promote the prompt and final 
resolution of any dispute regarding the interpretation of my will (or my trust) or 
the administration of my estate or any trust under my will (or my trust), I direct 
that any such dispute shall be settled by arbitration administered by the American 
Arbitration Association under its Arbitration Rules for Wills and Trusts then in 
effect.  Nevertheless the following matters shall not be arbitrable[:]  questions 
regarding my competency, attempts to remove a fiduciary, or questions 
concerning the amount of bond of a fiduciary.  In addition, arbitration may be 
waived by all sui juris parties in interest.  
 
The arbitrator(s) shall be a practicing lawyer licensed to practice law in the state 
whose laws govern my will (or my trust) and whose practice has been devoted 
primarily to wills and trusts for at least ten years.  The arbitrator(s) shall apply the 
substantive law (and the law of remedies, if applicable) of the state whose laws 
govern my will (or my trust).  The arbitrator’s decision shall not be appealable to 
any court, but shall be final and binding on any and all persons who have or may 
have an interest in my estate or any trust under my will (or my trust), including 
unborn or incapacitated persons, such as minors or incompetents.  Judgment on 
the arbitrator’s award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.199  
 
This provision is to be included in the trust itself rather than in a side agreement, in 
accordance with suggestions made by various experts in trust arbitration.
200
  While the clause 
contains language that is common to model arbitration clauses used outside the context of trust 
arbitration and is in that sense unremarkable,
201
 the AAA also addresses a number of issues 
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b.  Means of addressing known problem points 
Commentators have identified five areas of concern regarding mandatory trust arbitration:  the 
impermissible ouster of the courts, the operability and effectiveness of the arbitration provision, 
the extent to which the arbitration provision is binding on the party against whom the provision 
is asserted, proper representation of parties and arbitrability.
202
  Many of these issues overlap as a 
matter of theory, and the AAA Model Trust Clause demonstrates how difficult it can be to 
separate each of the various elements as a matter of practice.
203
  The clause also demonstrates 
how difficult it can be to address these issues adequately, for although the AAA clearly attempts 
to deal with a number of trust-related matters, significant problems remain.   
 
   i. Operability and effectiveness of the arbitration agreement  
One of the key concerns relating to a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust is whether that 
provision is operable, effective and capable of being performed under statutory requirements 
concerning an agreement to arbitrate.
204
  Surprisingly, the AAA Model Trust Clause does 
nothing to address this particular issue, even though this is one area where good drafting is likely 
to make a significant difference in a court’s willingness to enforce a mandatory arbitration 
provision.
205
   
The better approach would be to include language that demonstrates the existence of 
certain contract-related elements.
206
  For example, the clause could invoke the concept of 
conditional transfer by including language indicating that: 
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benefiting from the trust would be deemed an agreement to submit trust disputes 
to arbitration.  By accepting the gifts or invoking any rights under the trust deed, 
the beneficiaries would be deemed to agree to settle any dispute in accordance 
with the arbitration agreement contained in the trust deed.
207
   
 
Alternatively, the provision could attempt to create a contractual relationship with the 
trustee by highlighting the existence of consideration on both sides and by requiring the signature 
of the trustee as well as the settlor.
208
  As it stands, there is no such language in the AAA Model 
Trust Clause, which leaves the question of the operability of the clause entirely dependent on 
background principles of law.
209
  This is not only unnecessary, it is somewhat dangerous given 
the uncertain nature of that law in many jurisdictions and the possibility of a negative bias 
towards arbitration.
210
   
 
ii. Binding the proper parties and proper representation of those  
 parties  
Difficulties also arise with respect to the way in which the AAA Model Trust Clause attempts to 
bind all potential parties to a trust dispute and ensure proper representation of those parties.
211
  
Rather than specifically invoking theories of conditional transfer (which would help establish 
that the arbitration provision was binding on beneficiaries) or virtual representation (which 
would help remind courts that unborn, unascertained and legally incapacitated persons can have 
their rights adjudicated by a proper representative), the AAA Model Trust Clause chooses to 
state, without more, that all interested persons, including those that are unborn or incapacitated, 
                                                          
207
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are bound by the clause.
212
  Although this type of declarative language may adequately 
demonstrate the settlor’s intent to arbitrate with those parties, it does little to address any 
underlying concerns a court may have about arbitration involving those kinds of potentially 
vulnerable parties.
213
  Furthermore, the AAA’s failure to include unascertained beneficiaries in 
the list of potential parties could prove problematic, since a court could interpret that as an 
intentional omission. 
The better approach would be to include specific language regarding how the various 
parties will be bound, including the manner in which any representatives are to be appointed and 
paid.
214
  While it is good that the AAA has specifically mentioned unborn and legally 
incapacitated beneficiaries, since that will eliminate questions about whether the arbitration 
provision was meant to apply to those persons as well as to named beneficiaries, unascertained 
beneficiaries should also be included on the list of potential parties. 
 
iii. Arbitrability   
Although there is no “penalty” associated with having an inappropriately broad arbitration 
provision,
215
 wise lawyers do not include patently non-arbitrable matters in their arbitration 
provisions, since that will only lead to litigation, thus wasting both time and money.
216
  
However, the AAA takes a highly and unnecessarily conservative approach to arbitrability and 
explicitly excludes a number of matters from the scope of arbitration.
217
  The reason for this 
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reticence is unclear, particularly given the broad range of issues that are considered arbitrable 
under existing legislation.  For example, the UTC allows nonjudicial resolution of matters such 
as: 
(i) the interpretation or construction of trust terms; (ii) the approval of a trustee’s 
report or accounting; (iii) the direction to a trustee to refrain from performing a 
particular act or the grant to a trustee of a necessary or desirable power; (iv) the 
resignation or appointment of a trustee; (v) the transfer of the situs of trust 
administration; and (vi) the liability of a trustee for an action relating to a trust.
218
   
 
Interestingly, several of the AAA’s excluded items would fall within the UTC’s list of 
arbitrable issues.
219
  Other statutes go even further than the UTC with respect to the types of 
matters that are amenable to arbitration.
220
   
Of course, parties may choose to modify the AAA’s proposed language by removing 
references to some or all of the excluded matters.  However, even if all of the listed items were 
taken out of the clause, arbitration might nevertheless be limited to matters involving the 
interpretation and administration of the trust, based on the structure of the sentence discussing 
the scope of the clause.
221
  While the terms “interpretation” and “administration” may be 
sufficiently broad to include all matters relating to the trust, parties who want to avoid future 
disputes about the scope of the arbitration provision should consider using more standard 
language, such as that requiring arbitration of “any and all disputes which may arise out of or in 
connection with” the trust, since fewer questions will arise with regard to the interpretation of 
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that kind of clause.
222
  Furthermore, experience suggests that some courts are already willing to 
uphold those sorts of expansive provisions in the context of trust-related arbitration.
223
   
 
iv. Ouster of the courts 
Although the AAA Model Trust Clause does not appear to address issues relating to the possible 
ouster of the courts on its face, the clause does include language specifically stating that all 
interested parties may join together to waive the arbitration provision.
224
  As innocuous as this 
phrase may seem, it could be useful in helping overcome concerns about the impermissible 
ouster of courts because it indicates that arbitration will not be required if all parties to the actual 
dispute oppose such procedures.
225
  Although the application of the provision is somewhat 
limited, in that arbitration will be required if even one party to the dispute wants to proceed in 
arbitration,
226
 the AAA’s approach is consistent with judicial decisions holding that a mandatory 




c. AAA additional measures 
Although the AAA Model Trust Clause demonstrates some shortcomings with respect to issues 
known to cause concern in trust disputes, the AAA has nevertheless introduced some interesting 
additional measures in its treatment of trust arbitration.  The first of these involves the AAA’s 
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description of the qualifications of the arbitrator.
228
  The trust community has occasionally 
expressed some concerns about arbitrators’ ability to handle complicated trust disputes,229 and 
the AAA has done well to include an explicit description of the amount and type of experience 
that arbitrators should have.  While this sort of language may not be entirely new in the world of 
arbitration, it may be an effective means of encouraging courts to uphold arbitration provisions 
in trusts, since the judge and the parties will be assured of a competent decision-maker. 
A second measure is somewhat more troubling.  The issue here involves language stating 
that arbitrators are to “apply the substantive law (and the law of remedies, if applicable) of the 
state whose laws govern” the trust.230  On the one hand, the provision appears largely 
unobjectionable, in that it simply states what would appear to be obvious.  However, it is 
possible that a court could view the language as tying the hands of the arbitral tribunal and 
restricting a conflict of laws analysis that might result in the application of the mandatory rules 
of law of a state other than that chosen by the parties.
231
  Since determinations regarding 
arbitrability and the impermissible ouster of the courts may turn on whether a court believes that 
its own mandatory rules of law will be considered by the arbitrator,
232
 a better solution might be 
for the AAA to adopt or incorporate by reference the conflict of laws approach set forth in the 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on Their Recognition (Hague 
Convention on Trusts).
233
  The Hague Convention on Trusts constitutes an internationally 
recognized means of balancing issues relating to conflict of laws, and incorporating the 
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principles of that instrument in the AAA Model Trust Clause could help increase the 
enforceability of arbitration provisions found in trusts by giving courts an increased degree of 





2. The ICC Model Trust Clause 
Several years after the AAA published the AAA Wills and Trusts Arbitration Rules, the ICC 
convened its own expert working group to consider issues relating to the arbitration of trust 
disputes.
235
  After a lengthy consultation process, the ICC produced the ICC Model Trust Clause 
in 2008.
236
   
 
  a. Text and context 
The text of the ICC Model Trust Clause states that:   
[a]ll disputes arising out of or in connection with the trust created hereunder shall 
be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of 
Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed by the ICC International Court of 
Arbitration (the “Court”) in accordance with the said Rules.  
 
The settlor hereby agrees to the provisions of this arbitration clause and the 
trustees, any protector and their successors in office, by accepting to act under the 
trust, also agree or shall be deemed to have agreed to the provisions of this 
arbitration clause.  Accordingly, they all agree to settle all disputes arising out of 
or in connection with the trust in accordance with this arbitration clause. 
 
As a condition for claiming, being entitled to or receiving any benefit, interest or 
right under the trust, any person shall be bound by the provisions of this 
arbitration clause and shall be deemed to have agreed to settle all disputes arising 
out of or in connection with the trust in accordance with this arbitration clause. 
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If, at any time, any person requests to participate in arbitral proceedings already 
pending under the present arbitration clause, or if a party to arbitral proceedings 
pending under this arbitration clause desires to cause any person to participate in 
the arbitration, the requesting party shall present a request for joinder to the Court 
setting forth the reasons for the request.  It is hereby agreed that if the Court is 
prima facie satisfied that a basis for joinder may exist, any decision as to joinder 
shall be taken by the Arbitral Tribunal itself.  When taking a decision on the 
joinder, the Arbitral Tribunal shall take into account all relevant circumstances, 
including, but not limited to, the provisions of the trust and the stage of the 
proceedings.  It is further agreed that the Court may reject the request for joinder 
if it is not so satisfied, in which case there shall be no joinder.  In case of a joinder 
after the signature or approval of the Terms of Reference, an amendment to the 
same will be made either through signature by the parties and the Arbitral 
Tribunal or through approval by the Court, pursuant to Article 18 of the ICC 
Rules of Arbitration.  It is agreed that in such a case, the Court may take whatever 





As can be seen, the ICC’s model clause is very different than that of the AAA.238  
However, the differences extend beyond the language of the model clauses themselves.  When 
publishing the ICC Model Trust Clause, the ICC working group included a detailed commentary 
discussing various issues relating to the arbitration of trust disputes and the possible 
interpretation of the model clause.
239
  Not only does this commentary help judges and arbitrators 
interpret and apply the ICC Model Trust Clause, it also provides useful tips to those involved in 
drafting arbitration provisions for use in trusts, regardless of whether the process will ultimately 
be administered by the ICC.
240
   
The ICC commentary contains a number of relatively general suggestions such as the 
recommendation that the ICC Model Trust Clause be included in the trust instrument itself rather 
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than in a side agreement, a technique that is advocated by experts in trust arbitration.
241
  The 
commentary also cautions parties about the use and modification of the proposed language, 
noting that: 
[g]iven that the use of arbitration to resolve trust disputes is in its infancy 
(emerging legislation, limited case law and divergent academic opinions), parties 
are encouraged to exercise great care when using and possibly adapting the ICC 




While parties might prefer to have a higher degree of certainty about the enforceability of 
the ICC Model Trust Clause, the ICC was wise to highlight the developing nature of this area of 
law.
243
  However, as the following discussion notes, the ICC working group has done an 
excellent job in addressing many of the major issues in this field, which should increase the 
likelihood that the ICC Model Trust Clause will be found enforceable in the U.S. and 
elsewhere.
244
   
 
b. Means of addressing known problem points   
As noted previously, mandatory trust arbitration gives rise to a number of concerns, including 
those regarding the impermissible ouster of the courts, the operability and effectiveness of the 
arbitration provision, the extent to which the arbitration provision is binding on the party against 
whom the provision is asserted, proper representation of parties and arbitrability.
245
  Although 
the ICC Model Trust Clause does not explicitly address all of these issues and in some cases 
combines its treatment of certain items, the associated commentary helps give a more 
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comprehensive picture of how the ICC working group chose to handle the various issues that 
routinely arise in trust arbitration.
246
   
 
ii. Operability and effectiveness of an arbitral clause that is also  
binding on the parties 
The first way in which the ICC Model Trust Clause differs from the AAA Model Trust Clause 
involves the ICC’s attempt to bolster (1) the operability and effectiveness of the arbitral clause 
and (2) the ability of that provision to bind the various parties.
247
  Whereas the AAA Model Trust 
Clause was silent with regard to both issues, the ICC Model Trust Clause explicitly incorporates 
contract-oriented language stating that the settlor “agrees” to the arbitration clause along with the 
trustees, protectors and any successors who are “deemed to have agreed” to the clause.248  This is 
relatively strong language that is likely to be sufficient to bind the various parties to the 
arbitration and might only be improved by a reference to any remuneration that the trustees, 
protectors or successors will receive in connection with the trust.
249
  However, that information 
would likely exist elsewhere in the trust instrument, so it may not be necessary to refer to it 
explicitly in the arbitration provision. 
 The ICC uses similar “deemed to have agreed” language with respect to beneficiaries, 
which is again likely to have a positive effect on both the operability of the arbitration provision 
and its ability to bind these particular parties.
250
  Although the language here is somewhat British 
in tone (English trust law uses the term “deemed acquiescence” to describe a practice that is 
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essentially indistinguishable from conditional transfer),
251
 that is not likely to cause any 
problems under U.S. law.  Furthermore, it would be relatively easy for a settlor to change the 
language to incorporate the term “conditional transfer” if it was considered useful to do so.  
The ICC also discusses these issues in the commentary, stating that:  
[a]s a general rule, the trustees and any protector will agree to arbitration by 
accepting their office under the trust.  In most cases, it should in addition be 
possible to have trustees and protectors sign the instrument containing or referring 
to the ICC arbitration agreement.  As for the beneficiaries, the ICC arbitration 
agreement makes their benefit under the trust conditional upon their agreeing to 
arbitration.  The fact of claiming, being entitled to or receiving any benefit under 
the trust will be deemed to imply that they have agreed to ICC arbitration.  
Whether this will be an effective means of extending jurisdiction over non-




Although the ICC is again wise to highlight the fact that some courts may be hostile to 
the use of concepts such as conditional transfer, the principle does seem to have sufficient 
support for settlors to move forward with trust provisions mandating arbitration.
253
  Furthermore, 
some jurisdictions in the U.S. and elsewhere will not require parties to rely on these sort of 
principles at all, since the ability to bind a party to arbitration through a provision in the trust is 
statutorily or judicially protected.
254
  The ICC working group has also done well to note the 
desirability of having trustees and protectors sign the instrument, since that may help bolster the 
contract-like qualities of the arbitration provision.
255
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The ICC working group included one other item in its discussion of the operability and 
effectiveness of the arbitration provision, noting that:  
[w]hatever the peculiarities of the trust, the arbitration agreement requires the consent of 
the parties.  Whether this must be in writing will depend on the applicable law.
256
   
 
Since consent per se can be established by the principle of conditional transfer, this 
language may best be interpreted as a reminder that drafting parties need to consider the extent to 
which an arbitration provision must meet other requirements regarding the form of an arbitration 
agreement.
257
  While many jurisdictions are relaxing their interpretation of what constitutes an 
“agreement in writing” under national and international arbitration laws,258 parties should 
nevertheless err on the side of caution and meet all form requirements currently imposed as a 
matter of statutory or common law.  Again, this may require parties to an international or 




   ii. Proper representation 
One way that the ICC Model Trust Clause could be improved is with respect to its treatment of 
unborn, unascertained and legally incompetent beneficiaries.
260
  Like the AAA, the ICC fails to 
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make any special provisions in its model clause for the appointment or payment of virtual 
representatives.
261
   
This is not to say that the ICC ignores the issue completely, since the attendant 
commentary expressly indicates that all interested parties must be properly represented in any 
arbitration and cautions drafters that “[t]he representation of beneficiaries, including in particular 
any minor, unborn or unascertained beneficiaries, . . . needs to be considered in the light of 
relevant laws.”262  Although this reference acts as a helpful reminder of the unique challenges 
regarding the representation of beneficiaries in trust arbitration, it would be better if the ICC 
proposed specific language regarding the appointment and payment of virtual or other 
representatives, even if such references were qualified as only being potentially relevant in some 
jurisdictions.
263
  Settlors planning to use the ICC Model Trust Clause should therefore approach 
this issue with caution and should consider drafting their own language to address the 
appointment and payment of representatives.
264
   
 
   iii. Arbitrability  
Unlike the AAA, which took a very conservative approach to the arbitrability of trust disputes, 
the ICC envisions few concerns in this regard, giving the tribunal jurisdiction over “all disputes 
arising out of or in connection to the trust.”265  This language should be interpreted quite broadly, 
in that it: 
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aims to apply to [a wide variety of] disputes internal to a trust (disputes between 
parties to a trust:  trustees and beneficiaries, trustees inter se and beneficiaries 
inter se).  [However, i]t does not attempt to apply to disputes external to a trust 
(disputes between trust parties and outsiders to the trust:  for example, attempts by 
the settlor’s creditors to attack the validity of the trust; contractual disputes 




The ICC’s approach to arbitrability is consistent with U.S. case law allowing the 
arbitration of “any and all disputes which may arise out of or in connection with” the trust 
agreement
267
 and with statutes that take an expansive view of the arbitrability of trust disputes.
268
  
However, the ICC working group did include a cautionary note in the commentary, stating that:  
[t]he Task Force appreciates that . . . the issue of arbitrability requires careful and 
country-specific attention (cf. any statutory jurisdiction provisions).  Depending 
on the relevant rules of the law governing the trust, it may, for example, be 





Furthermore, although the ICC mentions one type of statutory issue (directions from the 
court),
270
 settlors should note that other areas of concern also exist.  For example, settlors may 
wish to consider the relevance of exclusive jurisdiction clauses concerning other tasks (such as 
the ability to approve a settlement of a trust dispute)
271
 and the interaction between trust law and 
various statutory rights (such as those involving forced heirs, elective shares, marital rights and 
other concerns relating to the law of succession).
272
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c. ICC additional measures  
The ICC Model Trust Clause and commentary are relatively comprehensive when it comes to 
addressing the major issues of importance in mandatory trust arbitration.
273
  However, the ICC 
also includes a number of additional measures in its model arbitration provision.
274
  The most 
forward-thinking of these involves joinder of additional parties.
275
   
Because trust disputes proceed in rem,
276
 arbitrators may need to devise special 
procedures to ensure that all actual and potential parties receive adequate notice of and an 
opportunity to participate in the proceedings.
277
  Other measures may also be necessary to allow 
for the late joinder of interested persons.
278
  While courts and arbitrators currently address these 
matters on an ad hoc basis,
279
 a more transparent and predictable procedure would be preferable, 
both for the parties’ benefit and as a means of increasing the likely enforceability of the various 
provisions, since courts may be more inclined to enforce arbitration agreements or awards when 
the arbitral procedures are identified well in advance of the arbitration.
280
   
Unlike the AAA, which did not make any special provision in this regard, the ICC takes 
the view that a party to a trust dispute may join the arbitration at any time, subject only to a 
prima facie review of the reasonableness of the request by the ICC Court and, ultimately, the 
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discretion of the arbitral tribunal.
281
  The ICC is somewhat vague as to the standard to be used in 
deciding whether joinder is proper, stating only that “all relevant circumstances, including, but 
not limited to, the provisions of the trust and the stage of the proceedings,” are to be taken into 
account.
282
  Although this language does not provide a great deal of guidance, it is likely that no 
more definite standard can be established at this point, given the diversity of types of trust 
disputes that can arise. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Hostile trust litigation is becoming increasingly common, leading many settlors and trustees to 
inquire about the use of arbitration as a means of avoiding lengthy and expensive court battles.
283
  
Trust law specialists therefore need to be aware not only of the extent to which mandatory 
arbitration provisions in trusts are enforceable in a particular jurisdiction (a situation that is 
changing rapidly),
284
 but also how best to draft an enforceable arbitration provision, given the 
unique challenges in this area of law.  As it turns out, there are a number of ways that settlors can 
increase the enforceability of an arbitration provision found in a trust through the use of proper 
language.   
Experts suggest that drafting parties begin with a well-known model clause provided by a 
reputable arbitral institution,
285
 and the AAA and ICC Model Trust Clauses provide two good 
starting points in this regard.
286
  Although both provisions have their strong points, the ICC 
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Model Trust Clause appears to do a somewhat better job of addressing the unique challenges 
relating to trust arbitration.
287
  While some further improvements can still be made, parties would 
therefore be advised to look to the ICC Model Trust Clause as a paradigm of best practices in 
drafting an arbitral provision in a trust.
288
  Furthermore, it is entirely possible for settlors to pick 
the best aspects of the AAA and the ICC model clauses and combine them.
289
 
Although there are those who strongly oppose mandatory arbitration of trust disputes, 
increased use of arbitration provisions in trusts appears inevitable.
290
  As a result, settlors should 
not shy away from adopting arbitration provisions in appropriate cases but should instead focus 
on identifying and adopting proper language so as to maximize the likelihood of that provision’s 
being upheld by a court.  Indeed, as this Article has shown, there are numerous ways that a well-
informed drafter can increase the enforceability of an arbitral provision found in a trust, thus 
satisfying the wishes of both clients and courts. 
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